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Introduction 
I envision that just war theory will continue to have a place in Catholic Social Teaching (CST) and 
social ethics, but that its role will become increasingly marginal to the positive advocacy of 
peacemaking or peacebuilding. This is already evident in the “growing edges” of just war theory, 
such as jus post bellum, just ante bellum, just policing, and the reinvigorated nuclear disarmament 
movement.1 All of these iterations of just war theory make its role restrictive, stringent, and even 
prohibitive in relation to the use of armed force. They push its function away from the justification 
of war and toward alternative methods of avoiding or resolving conflicts, with an emphasis on the 
moral imperative of protecting or reconstituting just and peaceful social life. Even more indicative 
is the increasing emphasis of CST since Vatican II on the Christian responsibility and the realistic 
possibility of finding diplomatic and other nonviolent ways to avoid and end conflicts. Recent 
popes in particular have made extremely strong statements against the political use of armed force. 
An important historical factor is that the dominant type of conflict in today’s world is no longer 
“war” in the sense of conflicts between or among nation-states. These have declined since World 
War II. Today most conflicts occur within nation-states, or across their borders, including civil 
wars, insurgencies, religious and ethnic conflicts, and terrorism. Of course, such conflicts can be 
fueled by and become proxy wars for national governments, including those of the nations in which 
they occur. Nevertheless, “just war” criteria formulated for use by heads of states and their advisors 
are no longer adequate to this changed situation, both because national governments have 
diminished control of armed force and because those who do control it are not always motivated 
by concerns of justice as just war theory defines it. 
Due to the proliferation and intransigency of sub-state and trans-state conflicts, the salient area 
in which CST still retains a place for armed force is humanitarian intervention. However, even in 
cases in which it is clear that massive human rights abuses are resulting from the inability or 
unwillingness of a state to protect its citizens or resident aliens, the use of force by outside powers 
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has only a tenuous ability to bring long-lasting peace.2 Outside force may be the only alternative 
to stop killing, for example in Rwanda (where a failure of international will permitted ongoing 
genocide), East Timor (where force stopped military violence against civilians and led to 
independence), and potentially in Myanmar (where military violence has, as of early 2018, killed 
over 7,000 and displaced over 600,000 people belonging to the Rohynga Muslim minority). On 
the other side, however, the 1999 NATO bombing of Kosovo in response to Serbian ethnic 
violence against the Albanians exacerbated ethnic tensions and led to more violence; the 2003 
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq destabilized the entire society and increased anti-Western terrorism; and 
more recent interventions in Libya and Syria were in important ways misguided and ultimately 
failures. 
For these practical reasons, as well as because of the formative, long-standing, and gospel-based 
commitment to forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace, Catholic social teaching since the Second 
Vatican Council, especially papal teaching, has constantly reiterated the immorality and self-
defeating character of violence. It has urged nonviolent solutions to political conflicts and to armed 
violence actually occurring. Catholic social ethics and activism increasingly highlight the 
importance and promise of constructive peacemaking or peacebuilding toward the goal of a just 
peace.3 This trajectory is captured in the title of Pope Francis’s 2017 World Day of Peace Message: 
“Nonviolence: A Style of Politics for Peace.”4 While the popes do not completely eliminate the 
idea or possibility of justified use of armed force, they minimize its effectiveness and moral 
acceptability. Instead, they train their attention on nonviolent conflict transformation as a 
concomitant of Christian identity, a moral obligation, and a social-political strategy that can be 
effective and successful.5 
 
Restrictive Just War Theory 
The Christian just war ethic (and most of its secular counterparts) has evolved over sixteen 
centuries to include two categories of criteria: jus ad bellum (justice in going to war) and jus in 
bello (justice in war). The criteria within these categories can be formulated in somewhat different 
ways, but standard versions include, within jus ad bellum, defense of the peace and common good, 
last resort, right intention, proportionality of destruction caused to good results, and legitimate 
authority in declaring war. Within jus in bello, the primary criteria are noncombatant immunity 
and proportionality of means used to the objective.6 In a “classic” assessment, John Courtney 
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Murray defines the purposes of the just war ethic, especially as a Christian ethic, as the 
condemnation of war as evil, the limitation of the evil war entails, and the humanization of the 
conduct of war as far as possible.7 Regarding this definition, two fairly obvious points may be 
made. First, the premise of the entire just war tradition and its criteria is that war is a tremendous 
evil, to which the fundamental moral response is not “justification,” but limitation and restraint. 
Second, in reality, neither this premise nor the limiting functions of just war criteria that Murray 
envisioned have always governed the popular conception of just war theory or its use by war-
making governments. Many would aver, to the contrary, that what passes for just war theory and 
criteria is often a thinly veiled rationalization of national or group self-interest. 
A keynote for the emergence, since World War II, of a more skeptical Catholic stance toward 
the justifiability of war and the possibility of keeping war’s conduct within just parameters is 
certainly John XXIII’s Pacem in terris (1963). Asserting that international disputes “must be 
resolved by negotiation and agreement, and not by recourse to arms,” the pope warns that “it no 
longer makes sense to maintain that war is a fit instrument with which to repair the violation of 
justice.”8 A special threat for this pope, writing at the height of the Cold War, is the danger of 
nuclear weapons (including the economic burden of the arms race), plus “the terrifying destructive 
force of modern weapons” in general. To these we can add the unrestrained violence and atrocities 
that inevitably accompany all war and have been among the intentional means of means of war in 
conflicts such as those in the former Yugoslavia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guatemala, 
and Cambodia. 
Following John XXIII’s lead, the United States bishops, in their 1983 peace pastoral, The 
Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response,9 maintain that pacifism and just war theory 
are united by a presumption in favor of peace and against war. This means that the burden of proof 
is on those who would justify war, and that such justification must meet a very high bar.10 
Militarism and the militarization of international problems are thus ruled out. As Gerard Powers 
maintains, “War is the failure of politics, not its extension […]. The resort to military force is 
sometimes necessary, to be sure, but it is not a primary means of achieving even a negative 
peace.”11 A negative peace is one in which violent conflict has ended or subsided, but access to 
basic needs, and just and participatory institutions of civil society and government, may be lacking. 
A positive peace is peace with justice: rule of law, human security, and equitable social institutions 
and structures.12 In the perspective of CST today, war or more limited types of armed force can be 
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justified only if, as a last resort, they are the most viable way to achieve a just and sustainable 
peace. However, since war ordinarily destroys the social trust, infrastructures, and material goods 
necessary to a just peace, it also ordinarily is not “just.” 
According to Powers, the presumption against war creates a “hermeneutic” for the use of just 
war criteria in which they do not “readily justify war,” but instead “severely limit it.” The 
restrictive just war hermeneutic “reinforces the notion that just war criteria are strict restraints on 
when, why and how to use force, and it creates a heavy obligation to find and pursue nonviolent 
means of resolving conflict—i.e., to develop an ethic and praxis of peacebuilding.”13 In fact, 
Powers even regards just war theory so conceived as an essential part of preventing war and 
building peace, insofar as it both provides rationales against the use of force that does not meet 
strict criteria such as last resort, proportionality, reasonable hope of success, and protection of 
civilians and also requires securing the conditions of just and peaceful social life going forward. 
 
The Growing Edges of Just War Theory 
It is precisely such considerations that have led to the recent development of new categories of just 
war theory, especially jus post bellum, but also jus ante bellum.14 These categories support and 
extend the restrictive hermeneutic of just war criteria, and serve as a set of brakes on the advance 
toward war, rather than as a further impetus or set of rationalizations. The foremost theological 
proponent of jus ante bellum is Maureen O’Connell.15 Jus ante bellum envisions whether a 
particular use of force will or will not be conducive to a later just peace. Yet, similarly to the 
criterion of last resort, it also demands that pro-active peacemaking measures are adopted before 
war occurs, with the purpose of averting resort to force in the first place. Jus ante bellum, more 
than last resort, calls attention to structural violence and ongoing lower-level conflict and the need 
to find creative solutions. Thus jus ante bellum can be seen as a positive approach to building 
relationships, practices, and structures of peace.  
Jus post bellum has been developed for Christian social ethics preeminently by Mark Allman 
and Tobias Winright.16 Allman and Winright remind us that just cause and just intention have an 
inherent relation to the effects of any particular use of armed force. If defense of the common good 
and a lasting peace are really the cause intended by the wagers of war, then the relevant decision-
makers will also be invested in ensuring that post-conflict conditions will be conducive to social 
restoration. For example, the means of war must not destroy sources of livelihood and material 
The Future of (Catholic) Just War Theory: Marginal  24 
 
   
and social infrastructures requisite to the later building of a just peace. In addition, the war must 
be concluded on just terms (in brief, no victor’s justice). Just punishment that avoids an ethos of 
impunity, but does not feed back into cycles of vengeance, is imperative. Social processes of 
reconciliation must be consciously and formally undertaken so as to heal the wounds and rifts of 
war. This involves the repatriation, reintegration, and rehabilitation of former combatants, even in 
cases in which atrocities have been widespread. In light of these criteria, it is obvious that the 
justice of war is always an imperfect justice. For, how rarely will the criteria of justice after war 
be met! With this in mind, the criteria of jus post bellum serve as a warning that it is extremely 
difficult to meet the criteria of just war. Therefore, this new just war category likewise works as a 
warning light against justifying war. 
 
Humanitarian Intervention 
Humanitarian intervention was validated by the United Nations in 2005 under the rubric “the 
responsibility to protect” (R2P).17 Although sovereign states have the right and the duty to protect 
their own populations, other nations and the international community as a whole have a 
responsibility to intervene fairly and effectively in the face of atrocities such as occurred in 
Rwanda and Kosovo. John Paul II was the first pope to acknowledge this obligation when in 1993 
he declared that state sovereignty “cannot constitute a screen behind which torture and murder 
may be carried out.” In the face of unjust aggression against innocent civilians, “States no longer 
have a ‘right to indifference.’”18 
Such interventions must be subject to the same criteria as any other use of armed force, 
including noncombatant immunity and reasonable hope of success and, by implication, the ability 
to secure the ongoing safety of the populations at risk.19 Again, this sets a high bar. The U.S. 
bishops warn that humanitarian intervention could devolve into an excuse for “imperialism” or 
lead to “endless [and often fruitless] wars of altruism.” What the bishops call “effective nonviolent 
means” are always preferable and better the serve the end goal of establishing a just peace.20 
Elias Omondo Opongo, S.J., is a scholar and practitioner of transitional justice and post-conflict 
reconstruction. He heads the Hekima Institute of Peace Studies and International Relations in 
Nairobi, Kenya. Taking the example of intrastate conflict in Africa, he shows some of the pitfalls 
of humanitarian intervention, which he does see as justified in cases of “gross violation of human 
rights.”21 But what may be justified in theory is not easy to put into practice. The use of force by 
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external parties with limited familiarity with the complexities of local situations will have limited 
success in the challenge “to settle grievances and disputes; end political, ethnic, and economic 
marginalization; and prevent genocide.”22 These are no doubt huge challenges for any would-be 
interveners, so Opongo recommends local alliances of intervention, for instance, forces sponsored 
by the African Union, as preferable. At the same time, “the historical evidence of military 
intervention indicates that there are limited success stories to demonstrate their effectiveness,” no 
matter who undertakes them.23 
 
Papal Teaching 
The possibility of using armed force has not been entirely excluded, with Popes Paul VI, John Paul 
II, Benedict XVI, and Francis all leaving the door open to limited justifications of humanitarian 
intervention or self-defense.24 However, this permission is far from central to their outlook. Instead 
they are motivated by the hope, expressed by Gaudium et spes, that positive peace and justice can 
result from human cooperation inspired by the gospel and humanity’s highest values.25 The 
integral connection of peace and justice was affirmed in the landmark exhortation of Paul VI, who 
declared that, “If you want peace work for justice,”26 and that “the new name for peace is 
development.”27 
In fact, and even paradoxically, the popes frequently make statements that seem to rule out 
armed force entirely. This serves to underline the immense priority of peacebuilding and reduce 
the likelihood that armed force will be considered a reasonable option. In a line repeated by every 
successive pope up to and including Francis, Paul VI exhorted the United Nations, “No more war, 
war never again! Peace, it is peace which must guide the destinies of people and of all mankind.”28 
Ultimately, “the Church cannot accept violence, especially the force of arms.”29 Benedict XV, Pius 
XII, John XXIII, and Paul VI all had experienced war and were extremely critical of “the utility 
of widespread violence,” even “at the service of defending or restoring an order of justice.”30 They 
reinforce the presumption against war as a just and effective means to gain political objectives. 
They stress the self-defeating nature of violence and the vocation of peace. 
This trend gains momentum under John Paul II, Benedict XVI, and Francis. John Paul II insists 
that “[v]iolence is evil,” “a lie,” and “the enemy of justice.”31 He titles his 1987 World Day of 
Peace Message “Development and Solidarity: Two Keys to Peace.”32 Yet, like the popes of the 
two World Wars, John Paul II is influenced by specific experiences of violence in his own era. He 
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validates the new concept of “humanitarian intervention,”33 and allows for a nation’s right of 
defense against terrorism.34 
Following John Paul II, Benedict endorses humanitarian intervention under the rubric 
“responsibility to protect.”35 Yet Caritas in veritate (2009) adds that the responsibility to protect 
must be implemented “in innovative ways.”36 He calls “love your enemies” the gospel’s “magna 
carta.”37 “Violence never comes from God.”38 Benedict insists that peace cannot exist without 
justice, as confirmed in his World Day of Peace Messages (2009, 2010, 2011). Pope Francis 
likewise calls international parties in conflict to seek peace by dialogue, reconciliation, negotiation, 
and compromise, for war is the “suicide of humanity.”39 Taking forward themes of Pacem in terris, 
he denounces not only the use of nuclear weapons, but also their possession.40 Given the possibility 
of a 2013 military intervention in Syria by U.S. and French “superpowers,” Francis is insistent that 
“War brings on war! Violence brings on violence.”41 In a potent symbolic move, he led a peace 
vigil for Syria at the Vatican that attracted over 10,000 people. Francis is strong on the importance 
of putting all possible efforts into nonviolent methods of addressing conflict. Even in the case of 
the so-called Islamic State or ISIS, he calls for stopping aggression through less than lethal force. 
“The means by which [the unjust aggressor] may be stopped should be evaluated. To stop the 
unjust aggressor is licit, but we nevertheless need to remember how many times, using this excuse 
of stopping an unjust aggressor, the powerful nations have dominated other peoples, made a real 
war of conquest.”42 
Pope Francis’s most important statement on peace is his 2017 World Day of Peace Message, 
which underlines the futility of violence in bringing just and sustainable peace. Active 
nonviolence, faithful to the gospel, is “a way of showing that unity is truly more powerful and 
more fruitful than conflict.”43 “‘The name of God cannot be used to justify violence. Peace alone 
is holy. Peace alone is holy, not war!’”44 
 
In Conclusion 
The presence yet marginality of the just war framework in post-Vatican II papal teaching is evident 
from the fact that, without prohibiting armed force as immoral in every case, the popes do not 
dwell on or amplify the criteria of just war, nor do they present any specific use of force as justified. 
Instead, the emphasis is unequivocally on peace, nonviolence, justice, and peacebuilding. It is 
undoubtedly the case that some Catholic theologians and social ethicists will continue to refine 
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just war thinking and criteria, but the direction in which such work is heading is clearly toward 
more vehement critiques of war and more energy around peacebuilding, even when advanced 
under “just war” criteria, such as jus post bellum. In fact, it is debatable whether the best way to 
characterize these developments is as refinements of just war theory, rather than as ethical 
collaboration under a bigger umbrella, such as just peace or peacebuilding. It is certainly 
conceivable that some Catholic ethicists will propose armed force as an appropriate and necessary 
response to specific atrocities, now or in the future. Even so, it might be better (or at least more 
consistent with the direction of recent papal thought) to understand such arguments, not as 
expanding “just war theory,” but as applications of positive concepts of CST such as human 
dignity, the common good, and sustainable just peace. 
It is difficult to imagine that either the popes or mainstream theologians would in the 
foreseeable future justify “war” in the sense of the full-scale military engagement of nation-states, 
especially given the danger of nuclear weapons. For now, just war theory is not totally out of the 
magisterial or social-ethical picture. But it is marginal to the enterprise of reducing global violence 
and establishing justice, peace, and internationally cooperative societies in the present volatile and 
dangerous century. 
In fact, as exemplified by Francis’s 2017 World Day of Peace Message, the vocabulary and 
framework of CST’s approach to intranational and international conflicts centers on just peace and 
nonviolence, not just war. This positive, constructive, peace-oriented social-ethical vision is key 
to the promotion of nonviolent conflict transformation and peacebuilding as realistic political 
possibilities and not only ecclesial ideals. The Catholic Church has a countercultural message 
about military force, but it is not a sectarian “peace church.” The purpose of CST, including its 
peacebuilding profile, is to contribute to more just societies and to increase justice in civil society 
and governance globally. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Mark J. Allman and Tobias L. Winright, “Growing Edges of Just War Theory: Jus ante 
bellum, jus post bellum, and Imperfect Justice,” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 
32/2 (2012): 173–91. In this essay, I will focus on the explicit expansion of just war 
The Future of (Catholic) Just War Theory: Marginal  28 
 
   
categories (jus ante bellum and jus post bellum). For just policing, see Gerald Schlabach, 
Just Policing, Not War: An Alternative Response to World Violence (Collegeville, MN: 
Liturgical Press, 2007) and Tobias Winright, “Just Policing and the Responsibility to 
Protect,” The Ecumenical Review 63/1 (2011): 84–95. 
2. Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000), Kosovo Report, available 
at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6D26FF88119644CFC125698900
5CD392-thekosovoreport.pdf. 
3. See the website of the Catholic Peacebuilding Network 
(https://kroc.nd.edu/research/religion-conflict-peacebuilding/catholic-peacebuilding-
network/), and Robert J. Schreiter, R. Scott Appleby, and Gerard F. Powers, eds., 
Peacebuilding: Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
2010). 
4. See Pope Francis, “Nonviolence: A Style of Politics for Peace,” January 1, 2017, 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/peace/documents/papa-
francesco_20161208_messaggio-l-giornata-mondiale-pace-2017.html.  
5. See Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic 
Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Maria J. 
Stephan, “How the Catholic Church Can Bolster Alternatives to Violence: As the Vatican 
Considers a Shift on ‘Just War,’ Nonviolent Action Could be Key,” November 1, 2017, 
United States Institute of Peace, 
https://www.usip.org/index.php/publications/2017/11/how-catholic-church-can-bolster-
alternatives-violence; as well as other works on nonviolent resistance on the website of the 
USIP (https://www.usip.org/people/maria-j-stephan). 
6. For a historical discussion, see James T. Johnson, “Just War: International Law,” 
Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/just-war. Johnson is a major 
historian of Christian just war thought. 
7. John Courtney Murray, S.J., “Remarks on the Moral Problem of War,” Theological Studies 
20 (1959): 40–61. 
29  Cahill 
 
 
8. John XXIII, Pacem in terris, April 11, 1963, §§126–127, 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-
xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html. 
9. See United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God’s 
Promise and Our Response, May 3, 1983, http://www.usccb.org/upload/challenge-peace-
gods-promise-our-response-1983.pdf. 
10. Ibid., §51. 
11. Gerard F. Powers, “From an Ethics of War to an Ethics of Peacebuilding,” in From Just 
War to Modern Peace Ethics, eds. Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven and William A. Barbieri, 
Jr. (Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2012), 289. 
12. See Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M., “Peacebuilding and Catholic Social Teaching,” in 
Peacebuilding, 268–273. 
13. Powers, “From an Ethics of War,” in From Just War to Modern Peace Ethics, 289. 
14. See Allman and Winright, “Growing Edges of Just War Theory.” 
15. Maureen O’Connell, “Jus Ante Bellum: Faith-Based Diplomacy and Catholic Tradition on 
War and Peace,” Journal for Peace and Justice Studies 21/1 (2011): 3–30. 
16. Mark J. Allman and Tobias L. Winright, After the Smoke Clears: The Just War Tradition 
and Post-War Justice (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2010). 
17. United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, 
http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html. 
18. John Paul II, “Address to the Diplomatic Corps Credited to the Holy See,” January 26, 
1993, §13, https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/speeches/1993/january/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19930116_corpo-diplomatico.html. 
19. See Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M., “Humanitarian Intervention and the Just War Tradition,” 
in Can War Be Just in the 21st Century? Ethicists Engage the Tradition, eds. Tobias 
Winright and Laurie Johnston (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis), 61–64. 
The Future of (Catholic) Just War Theory: Marginal  30 
 
   
20. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, 
November 17, 1993, §4, http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-
believe/catholic-social-teaching/the-harvest-of-justice-is-sown-in-peace.cfm. 
21. Elias Omondo Opongo, S.J., “Just War and Its Implications for African Conflicts,” in Can 
War Be Just in the 21st Century?, 150. 
22. Ibid., 146. 
23. Ibid., 154. 
24. The tone is set by Paul VI, Populorum progressio, March 26, 1967, §31, 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
vi_enc_26031967_populorum.html.  
25. Gaudium et spes, December 7, 1965, §78, 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html.  
26. Paul VI, 1972 World Day of Peace Message, January 1, 1971, 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_p-
vi_mes_19711208_v-world-day-for-peace.html, citing the 1971 Synod of Bishops’ Justitio 
in mundi, §6. 
27. Paul VI, Populorum progressio, §87. 
28. Paul VI, 1965 Address to the United Nations General Assembly, October 4, 1965, 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/speeches/1965/documents/hf_p-
vi_spe_19651004_united-nations.html.  
29. Paul VI, Evangelium nuntiani, 1975, §37, http://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-
vi/en/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_p-vi_exh_19751208_evangelii-nuntiandi.html.  
30. Himes, “Peacebuilding,” in Can War Be Just in the 21st Century?, 279. 
31. John Paul II, Homily at Drogheda, Ireland, September 29, 1979, §§18–20, 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/homilies/1979/documents/hf_jp-
31  Cahill 
 
 
ii_hom_19790929_irlanda-dublino-drogheda.html; quoted in the 2006 Compendium of the 
Social Doctrine of the Church, no. 496. The pope further comments that “violence destroys 
what it claims to defend: the dignity, the life, the freedom of human beings.” 
32. John Paul II, 1987 World Day of Peace Message, “Development and Solidarity: Two Keys 
to Peace,” January 1, 1987, https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_19861208_xx-world-day-for-peace.html. 
He entitles his 2002 World Day of Peace message “No Peace without Justice, and No 
Justice without Forgiveness,” which extends Paul VI’s phrase “no peace without justice” 
in a way that clarifies justice as restorative and further illuminates the meaning of just 
peace. 
33. John Paul II, 2002 World Day of Peace Message, January 1, 2002, §11, 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp-
ii_mes_20011211_xxxv-world-day-for-peace.html.   
34. John Paul II, 2002 World Day of Peace Message, §5. 
35. Benedict XVI, Address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, April 
18, 2008, http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-
xvi/en/speeches/2008/april/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20080418_un-visit.html.  
36. Benedict XVI, Caritas in veritate, 2009, §7, http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-
xvi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate.html.  
37. Angelus Address, February 18, 2007, https://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-
xvi/en/angelus/2007/documents/hf_ben-xvi_ang_20070218.html; see also Good Friday 
message, April 22, 2011, http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-
xvi/en/speeches/2011/april/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20110422_via-crucis-
colosseo.html.  
38. Benedict XVI, Angelus Address, 2007. 
39. Pope Francis, “War is the suicide of humanity,” Vatican Radio, June 2, 2013, http:// 
media01.radiovaticana.va/audiomp3/00374893.MP3. 
The Future of (Catholic) Just War Theory: Marginal  32 
 
   
40. See Gerald O’Connell, “Nuclear disarmament now a ‘moral imperative’ as Pope Francis 
rejects deterrence,” America, November 13, 2017, https://www.americamagazine.org/ 
politics-society/2017/11/13/nuclear-disarmament-now-moral-imperative-pope-francis-
rejects. 
41. Pope Francis, Angelus Address, September 1, 2013, 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/angelus/2013/documents/papa-
francesco_angelus_20130901.html.  
42. Pope Francis, 2014 Press Conference, during return flight from South Korea, as quoted in 
Francis X. Rocca, “Pope talks airstrikes in Iraq, his health, possible U.S. visit,” Catholic 
News Service, August 18, 2014, https://www.ncronline.org/news/world/pope-talks-
airstrikes-iraq-his-health-possible-us-visit?_ga=2.180740327.1546312816.1511305791-
2123628133.1507130389. 
43. Francis, “Nonviolence: A Style of Politics for Peace,” 2017, §6. 
44. Ibid., §4. 
 
